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Abstract 
Green building adoption is driven by both performance-based benefits and marketing based 
benefits.  Performance based benefits are those that improve performance or lower operating 
costs of the building or of building users. Marketing benefits stem from the consumer response to 
green certification. This study illustrates the relative importance of the marketing based benefits 
that accrue to Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) buildings due to green 
signaling mechanisms, specifically related to the certification itself are identified. Of course, all 
participants in the LEED certification scheme seek marketing benefits.  But even among LEED 
participants, the interest in green signaling is pronounced.  The green signaling mechanism that 
occurs at the certification thresholds shifts building patterns from just below to just above the 
threshold level, and motivates builders to cluster buildings just above each threshold. Results are 
consistent across subsamples, though non-profit organizations appear to build greener buildings 
and engage in more green signaling than for-profit entities. Using nonparametric regression 
discontinuity, signaling across different building types is observed. Marketing benefits due to 
LEED certification drives organizations to build “greener” buildings by upgrading buildings at 
the thresholds to reach certification levels.  
  
 3 
Introduction 
Green building refers to the implementation of practices and products in construction that 
minimize harmful effects on the environment. With growing focus on sustainability, green 
building has been increasing in popularity, both on the commercial and residential levels.  
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification is currently one of the 
most recognized green building certification programs, both nationally and internationally. It was 
developed by the US Green Building Council (USGBC) to provide a scale on which green 
practices in building could be measured, and to provide a support for owners wishing to achieve 
green standards.  
LEED certification covers five primary categories covering the sustainability of a building. 
These categories include sustainable sites, water efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials 
and resource credits, and indoor environmental quality. Additional ‘extra credit’ points can be 
earned through innovation and design and regional priorities. Credits include the environmental 
footprint of construction, modeled building envelope performance, educational initiatives, and 
locational characteristics. Points are awarded based on standards set by the USGBC.  Minimum 
scores in each category must be met for a building to achieve certification. Additionally, the total 
score of a building determines certification levels, ranging from certified to Platinum.  
 Projects typically hire a LEED consultant or project manager to communicate expectations 
and documentation requirements to the builder, though many architecture and construction firms 
now offer this service in house. LEED project managers submit documentation for verification 
for each LEED credit they pursue after the design phase and again during the construction phase. 
Credits are reviewed individually by the USGBC. If the USGBC questions or denies that the 
criteria for a credit has been fulfilled, project managers can respond or appeal denied credits. 
While many credits are initially denied by the USGBC, project teams may withdraw those 
credits or produce documentation that verifies their accuracy. As a result, project teams, while 
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aiming for the minimum score of a specific certification level, may often leave a cushion – 
unless “the goal is to make the project the greenest project possible” [1].  
From a builder’s perspective, there are two clear benefits to green building: financial gains due 
to increased building performance and financial gains due to increased marketability. 
Green buildings are thought have performance benefits such as lower operating costs with 
relatively low incremental construction costs [2].  By consuming significantly less energy, green 
buildings may be cost-effective [3] (however, recent research suggests that a “rebound effect” in 
newer or renovated buildings may actually increase total energy consumption, relative to 
buildings of an older vintage) [4]. And green building is thought to improve indoor air quality, 
health, and comfort [5][6]. Through these factors, productivity of green building occupants has 
been estimated to be 21 percent higher than conventional building occupants [2], leading to 
crude estimates of productivity gains between $40 billion to $600 billion annually in the United 
States [7].  
Environmental rating schemes, such as the LEED certification program, serve to provide 
consumers with a basis for comparison among product alternatives [8]. Due to asymmetric 
information between building owners and prospective tenants or buyers, owners intending to 
lease or sell better-performing buildings struggle to recoup their investments when renters or 
buyers are uninformed or cannot verify the improvements [8-14]. With information asymmetry 
between owners and renters, LEED certification can signal renters about the quality or energy 
efficiency of the building [13]. Rents tend to rise with LEED points [15].  While LEED scoring 
allows owners (or builders) to transmit information to prospective tenants about energy 
efficiency of the building, the certification categories themselves transmit this information 
discontinuously. Consistent with research in information-based policies and environmental 
labeling programs, it may be that transmitting categorical LEED information conveys 
information more clearly to consumers than the raw LEED score (see [16, 17] for a discussion on 
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information provision and eco-labeling).  The prominence of these categories in shedding light 
on “green” facilities might also distort the signal and shape building owners’ incentives. 
Current market pressures suggest a demand for and a supply of environmental goods, even if it 
means higher prices [18]. This can motivate firms to engage in “green” marketing, or green 
signaling, attempting to develop an environmentally conscious image, even if no environmental 
benefits result [19, 20]. Research has suggested that green building certification of commercial 
buildings leads to a premium on rents and higher occupancy rates [21, 22], yet it is unknown 
how much of this benefit is due to improved performance of greener buildings versus the 
marketing benefits of green certification.  
Given that certification itself is likely to be costly (e.g., obtaining LEED certification, at any 
level, is more costly than just making “green” investments without informing the US Green 
Building Council and getting a LEED score), presumably all certifications are sought for some 
green marketing benefit.  A major question remains, however, how much of the certification is 
verifying the greener or better performance of the building and how much of the certification is 
signaling an image, status, or something else beyond performance? While all building owners 
receive some marketing benefit, the certification and signaling process provides uneven 
marketing benefits to building owners. Thus, even among those who are receiving some LEED 
marketing benefits through certification, we can examine the behavior of building owners at 
LEED scores that are on either side of the certification thresholds to understand the influence of 
green signaling on building owner behavior, in contrast to the certification of building 
performance. Further, the behavior may vary among different types of owners or building uses. 
While the numerical LEED score provides a verification of performance, the LEED certification 
provides a marketing signal. We assume that the performance benefits of LEED certified 
buildings are approximately equal on either side of the certification threshold; however, the 
green signaling or marketing benefits of certification may vary greatly, and provide motivation 
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for the accumulation of additional LEED points to upgrade beyond the next certification 
threshold. The LEED certification program’s scoring system offers an excellent opportunity to 
examine this question for one of the largest green certification programs for buildings in the 
world.  
  
Materials and Methods 
A. Theoretical Model 
Consider a competitive firm that takes market price for its product q as given at p.  This profit-
maximizing firm simultaneously chooses its output levels and also a level of investment in 
energy efficiency e.  Our general model divides costs into two components: production costs 
C(q, e) and energy efficiency investment costs E(q, e). Let production costs C be rising at an 
increasing rate in q, while C is declining and decreasing rate in e.  (In short, Cq>0, Cqq>0, Ce<0, 
Cee>0.)  This reflects diminishing returns to energy efficiency investments.  Cost savings may 
involve more efficient or productive use of energy or water inputs, and it could include lower 
factor prices.  Greater e might make inputs like energy, water, or even labor cheaper and easier to 
employ (e.g., harvesting rainwater, rooftop solar panels, happier workers).  Let energy 
investment costs rise at a nondeclining rate in e, while the scale of the firm (q) leads to E rising 
in q at a nondeclining rate.  (In short, Ee>0, Eee≥0, Eq>0, Eqq≥0.)  The intuition behind this model 
is that, given standard assumptions about rising production costs for a firm, energy efficiency 
investments translate into lower production costs but also incur the cost of that investment.  The 
firm maximizes the profit (as described by equation 1) by choosing q* and e*.   
(1)  Π = pq – C(q,e) – E(q,e) 
 
The firm’s task is thus to jointly solve the two first-order conditions, equations (2) and (3): 
(2)  Пq: p ≤ Cq + Eq 
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(3)  Пe: 0 ≤ Ce + Ee 
 
Profits are maximized when price p received for another unit of output is equated to the total 
(production and investment) costs incurred for that next unit of output, and when the cost savings 
from energy efficiency investment is equated to the incremental cost of that energy efficiency 
investment.  The firm balances additional output’s revenue against its costs while also balancing 
the up-front costs of additional energy efficiency investment against the cost-savings from 
improved performance on producing output.  (The 0 in equation (3) results from the energy 
efficiency investment e having no impact on sales price.  We relax that assumption shortly.) 
This basic model reflects a productive or cost-saving model for investments in e.  However, 
the investment in e may also give the firm a competitive advantage in the marketplace beyond 
any productivity impacts.  Firms are often thought to benefit from a “green” signal to consumers 
from some form of eco-certification or conspicuous environmentally friendly investment.  Firms 
that appear greener may be able to charge premiums for their products, boost demand and market 
share, or otherwise affect the price p they charge.  We model this similarly to monopolistic 
competition, where firms can charge a higher price for their output as their investment in energy 
efficiency increases (i.e., dp/de ≡ pe > 0, pee < 0).  When  pe > 0, then the left hand side of the 
inequality in equation (3) represents the additional per-unit-sold revenue effect (i.e., increase in 
price) of investments in e.  We rewrite this as:  
 
(3')  Пe: peq ≤ Ce + Ee 
 
Now, profit-maximizing demands that they balance their cost-savings plus their added per-unit 
revenue against their investment costs for another unit of energy efficiency.  As a result, as pe 
grows larger than zero, the optimal investment e* will also grow in order to maintain the equality 
 8 
in equation (3').  Intuitively, some investment in e is worthwhile from purely a cost-savings 
standpoint.  If that cost-savings investment also boosts demand for the product, then profit-
maximizing firms would increase their use of e until the returns to additional e (higher revenues, 
lower costs) equal its investment costs.  This model extends readily to include building 
developers or landlords, whose output (q) are facilities sold or rented to tenants. 
When pe falls to zero – there is no market advantage from additional increments of investment 
in e – we expect e* to fall.  This consequence from information asymmetries between owners 
and renters is well established [9, 13].  This can be particularly important if the green signaling 
provided by e discontinuously occurs when some threshold of e has been passed – (i.e. when the 
firm gets enough points for certification).  The discontinuous or “lumpy” nature of the impact of 
additional e on p, which seems to best describe green signaling mechanisms, complicates the 
first-order conditions above, which conveniently assume continuously differentiable functions.  
In the more discrete set-up, we expect to see that e* rises when pe > 0 but, once the threshold is 
passed and there are no additional price premiums associated with incremental investments in e, 
the firm would stop buying more e (except insofar as it confers profitable cost savings per 
equation (3)).  In an extreme example where Ce=0 and pe>0, we would expect the firm to invest 
up until the threshold where the revenue gains are at least as big as the cost to achieve that 
threshold (and no additional units of e).  Optimal e*'s would all be zero or right at the threshold.  
At the other extreme where Ce<0 and pe=0, then we would expect firms' investment e* to vary 
more continuously as their production and investment costs vary.  Likely, the reality is 
somewhere in between these two extremes, and we should see some (but not perfect) clustering 
in e* values around the certification threshold(s).  Regardless, when prices jump up as a 
threshold is crossed, this provides additional incentive to upgrade categories relative to what we 
would observe with no discontinuities around categories. 
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Many green building projects are undertaken by government authorities or nonprofits, and the 
previous profit-maximizing model may not apply well.  Instead, consider nonprofit or 
government agency seeking to maximize its output while otherwise facing the same decisions as 
the for-profit firm.  The optimization problem is a slightly more complex Lagrangian in equation 
(4): 
(4)  ℑ = q + λ(pq – C(q,e) – E(q,e)) 
 
The first-order conditions are: 
(5)  ℑq: 1 ≤ -λ(p – Cq – Eq)   ⇒  p + 1/λ ≤ Cq + Eq  
(6)  ℑe: 0 ≤ -λ(peq – Ce – Ee)    ⇒    peq ≤ Ce + Ee 
 
so (5) is like (2) except that optimal costs for additional units of output will exceed costs, 
which means that q will have to expand (relative to equation (2)’s solution) to keep the equality.  
Equation (6) still has the output-maximizing agency green signaling in order to boost demand for 
their output and thus enable them to expand their output (via improved profits and a relaxed 
constraint).  The model predictions for output-maximizing agencies closely resemble those for 
profit-maximizing firms, and the intuitions remain as long agencies still face budget constraints, 
though recent research suggests that for energy consumption, government tenants have a less 
elastic demand for building electricity consumption [4].  In other words, agencies still care to 
lower costs or raise prices insofar as it affords them the opportunity to increase output (rather 
than increase profits, as we expect from for-profit firms).  Nonprofit or government agencies still 
balance the energy efficiency investment costs against their productivity gains and their 
marketing gains. Government agencies and non-profits, for example, may seek to improve 
awareness of service availability, improve the desirability of their services, or increase their 
appeal to stakeholders. Whether there is more or less green signaling by for-profit firms, 
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compared to output-maximizing agencies, depends on many factors, such as their respective 
technologies, costs, demands faced, and marketing advantages from green signaling.  We test 
this question empirically as part of this analysis. 
How much of LEED certification is due to e as a productive input and how much is due to e as 
a green signal?  To observe this, we observe the amount of clustering around the thresholds and 
compare the number of firms at those thresholds to what we might otherwise expect from a 
smooth distribution of e values.  Two aspects of the LEED program design – discontinuous 
marketing benefits from additional points at the thresholds and no discontinuity in productivity 
benefits from additional points at the thresholds – allow us to identify the marketing advantages 
around the thresholds. 
 
B. Data 
Data on LEED projects are gathered from the USGBC website. The data available include the 
total LEED project score as well as some project details, such as the location, size, and owner 
details. 
To generate a consistent sample, the data analyzed are limited to New Construction projects 
that fell under the scoring versions 2.0 through 2.2. The data are then split into categories based 
on ownership type. The categories analyzed are: 
All New Construction (NC) 
Government Buildings (G) 
Non-Profit (NP) 
For Profit (P) 
Other (O) 
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The scoring system for New Construction, Versions 2.0-2.2, allows 69 total possible points, 
with scores of 26-32 earning certification, scores of 33-38 earning silver certification, scores of 
39-51 earning gold certification, and scores of 52 or higher earning platinum certification. 
 
Data are plotted as a histogram with USGBC point totals on the x-axis, and the number of 
buildings achieving that score on the y-axis.  The large spikes in density just to the right of 
thresholds garnering higher certification levels provide the most immediate evidence that 
signaling via levels or colors plays a prominent role in LEED certification. 
<insert Table 1 about here (descriptive stats)> 
Of 5,238 total projects, 36.4 percent of projects were completed by government agencies, 34.2 
percent by for profit entities, and 19.8 percent by non-profit organizations. A small number (7 
percent) did not have available ownership information. On average, buildings scored 
approximately 37 LEED points, with Non-profit organizations scoring slightly higher than 
Government agencies or for-profit entities. For the entire sample, 20.8 percent of buildings were 
certified, 34.3 percent were silver certified, 39.7 percent were gold certified, and 5.3 percent 
received platinum certification. Non-profit organizations were twice as likely to attain Platinum 
certification compared with Government or For-profit buildings. 
 
C. Methods 
We estimate the amount of LEED certifications attributable to e as a productive input 
(including both marketing and performance benefits) by dropping the certifications that occur 
just above or below the threshold certification levels from the dataset.  The logic here is that the 
thresholds introduce a discontinuity in the returns to higher points entirely due to enhanced status 
or signaling associated with a higher certification level.  Thus we seek to estimate the density of 
observations at points around the thresholds as if there were no threshold effects (i.e., the density 
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was smooth in the neighborhood of the threshold).  To calculate the predicted expectation of 
LEED points earned, conditional on there being no discontinuity or signaling mechanism, we 
estimate a kernel density function using MATLAB. The nonparametric kernel density estimates 
a locally smooth density estimation based solely on the observed distribution of certification 
scores [23]. This kernel density function removes the “lumpiness” caused by the threshold signal 
effects and represents the amount of LEED certification we might expect if e was merely a 
productive input with no special signal for crossing an arbitrary threshold. We multiply the 
kernel density function (which has a total area of 1) by the total number of projects to estimate 
the expected value of the total number of projects due to investments in e. 
In the spirit of regression discontinuity design [24] we identify the portion of marketing effects 
provided by the green signal on building behavior by calculating the difference between the 
observed number of buildings at each certification level and the number of buildings predicted 
by the kernel density function that disregards threshold effects. We assume that without signaling 
from crossing a certification threshold, the productive benefits of investments in additional e 
vary continuously on either side of the certification threshold. Put another way, the additional 
returns from achieving a score of 38 rather than a 37 (LEED silver) ought to be roughly similar 
to the additional returns to achieving a score of 39 (LEED gold) rather than a 38 – except for 
marketing advantages conferred by the higher certification status. The empirical density, which 
might contain sharp discontinuities around the threshold, can be compared to identify any 
unexpectedly high or low frequencies of LEED scores. Some, but not all, observations at 
threshold scores are “stacked” there because of green signaling benefits. This approach likely 
overstates the frequency scores just above LEED category thresholds, thus yielding conservative 
estimates of the signaling effect. 
The analysis of discontinuities at the thresholds extends beyond the central question of 
densities and observations stacking up just above thresholds.  We use a nonparametric regression 
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discontinuity design [22, 23] to explore other discontinuities at the thresholds.  Evidence that 
building projects’ observable characteristics differ significantly on either side of the threshold 
offers a test of sorting behavior around the marketing advantages of LEED classifications.  The 
test compares the expected values of project characteristics just above and just below each 
threshold based on locally smoothed regressions using data from only above and only below, 
respectively, with standard errors computed as in [22]. There should be no difference if project 
attributes do not jump at the threshold.  The results indicate more than just increased density 
above the thresholds.  They inform which types of projects and organizations are more likely to 
“upgrade” to point totals above thresholds.  
 
Results 
<<insert Tables 2 & 3 here>> 
<<insert Figure 1 about here >> 
 
When the buildings earning the two lowest and highest scores in each category are excluded 
and remaining scores are used to calculate a kernel density function as a comparison to actual 
scores, we find evidence of green signaling around the thresholds for all certification levels. 
Results are not sensitive to dropping one value on either side of a threshold or dropping two 
values on either side to generate the kernel density function (see figure 1 versus figure SI1). For 
simplicity, we present and interpret the results generated by the kernel density function that 
drops the 2 highest and lowest LEED certification scores on either side of the threshold 
(presented in Tables 1 and 2, and visualized in Figure 1). Results from the kernel density 
function that drops highest and lowest scores on either side of the threshold have similar results 
and are included in Figure SI1. Dropping more scores leads to a flatter counterfactual (i.e., 
efficiency gains only) distribution in Figure 1, and likely a better estimate of signaling effects, 
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although the approach of dropping fewer scores (Figure SI1) offers a more conservative estimate 
of signaling effects. 
The green signal produces large ‘stacks’ of observations at the thresholds for all certification 
levels, with sharper drop-offs in frequencies evident for gold and platinum certification levels 
than lower categories. Signaling across the distribution produces 15.2 percent (798 total 
buildings) excess certifications earning the point total just above a threshold, and an additional 
3.7 (215 total buildings) percent excess certifications earning the second least points in each 
certification level. Thus, almost 19 percent of building projects’ LEED scores are higher than 
they otherwise would be due to the signaling motivation. One in five buildings are “greener” 
than they would otherwise be due to the signaling effect of LEED.  
The signaling mechanism is consistent across subsamples, with all types of building clustering 
just above the thresholds regardless of owner type (see figures 3, 4, and 5).  Following the 
methodology described in [23], we demonstrate differences in the typical building characteristics 
on either side of the threshold. Table 4 displays the results. By testing for differences in the 
expected value of the frequency of buildings on either side of the threshold, the greater share of 
buildings built at each of the three LEED thresholds (Silver, Gold, and Platinum) confirm this (at 
p values less than 0.01). To further demonstrate how clustering of values is confined to just 
above thresholds, we conduct a falsification test using a fourth “threshold,” an arbitrary point 
total of 43.  At this non-threshold point, there is no statistically significant signaling consistent 
with greater building shares (p = 0.79).  
<<insert Table 4 about here>> 
Overall building patterns and signaling behavior appear to vary across ownership. Non-profit 
organizations tend to build a higher percentage of buildings earning Platinum certification and 
pursue green signals more than for-profit or government agencies. Non-profit institutions have a 
13.2 percent signaling effect at the lowest point total and a 8.7 percent signaling effect at the 
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second lowest point total. Government agencies have a total signaling effect of 14.5 percent 
across all categories at the lowest point total and an additional 4.9 percent at the second lowest 
total. For profit entities have a 13.1 percent signaling effect at the lowest point total and an 
additional 5.2 percent at the second lowest point total for each certification level. Figures 
demonstrating clustering by different types of organizations are included in the Supporting 
Information. 
The RD analysis in Table 4 shows that projects with certain building characteristics exhibiting 
signaling behavior at the thresholds. Governments tend not to signal at the Gold or Platinum 
levels. For profit firms tend to signal at all levels. College campuses are tend to signal at Gold 
and Platinum levels. Commercial buildings tend to signal at Silver and Platinum levels (but not 
Gold). Health care buildings are less likely to signal at Silver and Platinum levels. Hotels and 
resorts tend to signal at the Platinum level exclusively. Parks and stadiums tend to signal at the 
Gold level, and restaurants tend to signal at all levels. Results for these findings are consistent 
across bandwidths.  
Discussion 
The results consistently show that large numbers of buildings cluster at or above the cut off 
points for each certification level, and few buildings cluster just below the cut off points for each 
certification level. Nonparametric regression discontinuity analysis confirms this finding for all 
three thresholds at α=0.01. Because the kernel density function represents the locally smoothed 
density – an approximation of cost-effective performance benefits of LEED certification – these 
point clusters at the certification thresholds support the claim that many building owners seek 
green building certification levels in order to improve marketability, rather than merely to 
improve performance. When the expected point total of a building is just below the threshold, 
building owners often shift behavior to achieve point totals exceeding the next certification level.  
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The data also show some buildings that earn points in the higher end of the point range within 
each certification level. This distribution supports the idea that some building owners seek LEED 
certification but do not pay as close attention to the specific thresholds, trying to build the 
greenest building possible. However, because certification occurs after building construction, 
some firms may fall short of their target certification level, and may not be able to reach the next 
highest threshold. This behavior supports the idea that performance benefits drive at least a 
portion of certification behavior.  In contrast, evidence from prior research suggests that project 
owners choose target certification levels and subsequently select LEED criteria to reach target 
certification levels [25]. Our results suggest a combination of these behaviors. 
Across ownership types, non-profit institutions build a larger percentage of LEED buildings 
that are Platinum certified, have a higher average point total, and also employ the strongest green 
signal at the highest levels of certification. That non-profit organizations are more likely to build 
a Platinum certified building than a for-profit entity is not surprising – the social mission of a 
non-profit organization may place a higher value on social benefits than a for-profit entity. For-
profit firms tend to signal at all three certification levels, highlighting concerns regarding 
corporate greenwashing [26]. The stronger interest in sending green signals by the non-profits 
than the for-profits (21.9 percent vs. 18.3 percent, when counting the two lowest point totals in 
each category), is surprising, though the reliance of non-profit institutions on donors and external 
stakeholders may also lead to a greater signaling pressure. Government agencies, interestingly, 
tend not to signal at Gold and Platinum levels. This finding suggests that while public building 
standards may require or promote LEED certification, Gold and Platinum certification may not 
be justifiable as public officials use taxpayer funding. 
The RD results also demonstrate different sensitivities to signaling motivations for different 
building types. Campuses and higher education signaling at the Gold and Platinum levels is 
unsurprising given universities’ motivations to achieve leadership in green building and to 
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market signals to internal (e.g., students pressuring for sustainability) and external (e.g., those 
giving campus sustainability awards) stakeholders. Commercial buildings tend to signal at the 
Silver or Platinum levels, suggesting that there are marketing gains to LEED certification [15, 
22],and premium gains for Platinum certification. Restaurants signal at all three levels, perhaps 
demonstrating the marketing gains and user experience associated in a LEED building. Stadiums 
tend to certify at the Gold levels, perhaps reflecting environmental marketing efforts by 
professional sports [27] and larger financial gains available in high profile building uses. 
Similarly, hotels and resorts tend to signal at the Platinum level, suggesting a premium or 
exclusive marketing niche. Interestingly, health care buildings tend not to signal at Silver and 
Platinum levels (and at Gold exhibit a negative parameter coefficient). This suggests that the 
healthcare sector lags behind other sectors in environmental marketing, pays more attention to 
performance benefits of green building , and represents healthcare’s peculiar circumstance where 
administration faces constraints from insurance companies and government regulators. (Strict 
rules on chargeable rates may prevent cost recovery for upgrades to e, such that peq falls to zero, 
so health care buildings are less likely to pursue green signals than other buildings.)  
Table 4 makes clear that the impetus to “upgrade” and achieve more marketable levels of 
certification is not evenly distributed across all projects.  Some types of projects and owners 
appear more sensitive to threshold effects than others.  Thus, care should be taken in attributing 
differences in outcomes like energy efficiency, profitability, and even prices to LEED 
certification, because LEED category attainment is hardly independent of other key project 
characteristics. 
Marketing plays a very large role in motivating building owners to obtain LEED certification, 
but marketing benefits appear to raise LEED certification to higher point levels than we would 
otherwise expect, emphasizing that buildings are built “greener” due to LEED certification 
thresholds than they would otherwise have been built. Our evidence suggests that a total of 15 to 
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20 percent of LEED-certified buildings are achieving higher point totals than would be expected 
without the signaling that green certification provides. Across the entire distribution, a minimum 
of 1,570 to 4,190 additional LEED points are likely attributable to this signaling mechanism. In 
light of an efficiency paradox, where investment in energy-efficient buildings are thought to be 
under-invested in society, this points to an important role of green marketing in addressing 
efficiency investment deficits.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 All Government For Profit Non Profit Other 
Total Projects 5238 1910 1790 1038 385 
Mean 37.04 37.07 36.44 37.89 36.88 
Standard 
Deviation 
6.71 6.51 6.55 7.57 6.91 
Percent 
Certified 
20.79 18.64 23.41 20.62 21.04 
Percent Silver 34.27 35.86 35.87 29.67 32.21 
Percent Gold 39.67 41.31 36.37 40.94 41.82 
Percent 
Platinum 
5.25 4.19 4.30 8.77 4.94 
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Table 2: All New Construction, Buildings Earning Lowest and Second Lowest / Highest Scores 
in Each Category Excluded 
 Points Earned Actual Predicted Difference 
 25 1 26 -25 
     
Ce
rti
fie
d 
26 243 70 173 
27 178 140 38 
28 195 207 -12 
29 164 231 -67 
30 147 198 -50 
31 96 138 -40 
32 66 108 -42 
     
Si
lv
er
 
33 494 148 346 
34 430 243 187 
35 384 323 61 
36 289 317 -26 
37 150 231 -81 
38 48 151 -102 
     
G
ol
d 
39 523 147 376 
40 437 223 214 
41 287 325 -38 
42 258 383 -125 
43 192 369 -177 
44 131 306 -175 
45 94 229 -135 
46 65 162 -97 
47 41 109 -68 
48 27 69 -42 
49 16 41 -25 
50 6 22 -16 
51 1 14 -13 
     
Pl
at
in
um
 
52 65 18 47 
53 65 31 34 
54 44 46 -2 
55 34 52 -18 
56 22 50 -28 
57 23 40 -17 
58 8 28 -20 
59 6 18 -12 
60 4 11 -7 
61 2 7 -5 
62 1 4 -3 
63 1 2 -1 
64 0 1 -1 
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Table 3: Difference between Actual and Kernel Density Projected as a Percentage of Total 
Projects, Ownership Type Comparison, 2 lowest and highest point possibilities dropped 
  Points Earned All NC Government For Profit Non Profit 
  25 -0.5 -0.7 -1.5 -1.1 
Ce
rti
fie
d 26 3.3 3.2 2.9 3.4 
27 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.6 
28 -0.2 0.3 1.3 0.7 
29 -1.3 -0.4 -1.1 0.5 
30 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 -0.7 
31 -0.8 -0.8 -2.7 -0.9 
32 -0.8 -1.7 -3.2 -1.0 
Si
lv
er
 
33 6.6 6.0 7.7 6.3 
34 3.6 4.2 2.9 5.9 
35 1.2 2.7 4.0 1.3 
36 -0.5 -0.2 1.3 1.0 
37 -1.5 -1.4 -2.0 -1.5 
38 -1.9 -2.8 -4.4 -2.8 
G
ol
d 39 7.2 6.3 6.2 5.2 
40 4.1 3.2 5.5 3.2 
41 -0.7 -0.6 0.6 0.1 
42 -2.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.3 
43 -3.4 -3.0 -2.8 -1.3 
44 -3.3 -3.7 -2.7 -2.7 
45 -2.6 -2.9 -2.7 -2.7 
46 -1.8 -1.9 -2.4 -2.4 
47 -1.3 -1.7 -1.5 -2.0 
48 -0.8 -0.9 -1.3 -1.8 
49 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -1.1 
50 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -1.2 
51 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -1.0 
Pl
at
in
um
 
52 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 
53 0.6 0.5 0.4 1.0 
54 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
55 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
56 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 
57 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 
58 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.9 
59 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 
60 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 
61 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
62 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 
63 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
64 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
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Table 4. Tests for discontinuities at each of the LEED thresholds (Silver, Gold, and Platinum), 
as well as an arbitrarily determined point total (43).  Bandwidth is four. “Mean” represents the 
expected share of all buildings (for “Building Share”) or the expected proportion of buildings 
with that attribute (for all others) at the threshold; “alpha” represents the difference between the 
expected and observed proportions at the threshold. Bold indicates statistical significance at 
α = 0.10, for each of the variables. 
 Silver (33) Gold (39) Platinum (52) Random (43) 
Variable mean alpha p mean alpha p mean alpha p mean alpha p 
Building 
Share 0.004 0.09 0.00 -0.014 0.11 0.00 -0.003 0.02 0.00 0.030 0.01 0.79 
Govt 0.386 0.02 0.59 0.509 -0.10 0.03 1.625 -1.23 0.00 0.513 -0.10 0.08 
For Profit 0.252 0.12 0.01 0.301 0.08 0.09 0.000 0.32 0.01 0.283 0.03 0.64 
Non-Profit 0.362 -0.15 0.00 0.191 0.03 0.50 -0.625 0.92 0.00 0.204 0.08 0.12 
Campus 0.113 -0.01 0.57 0.013 0.11 0.00 0.000 0.18 0.09 0.199 -0.01 0.84 
Commerci
al 0.220 0.08 0.05 0.258 0.05 0.24 0.000 0.36 0.00 0.368 0.00 0.95 
Health 
Care 0.107 -0.05 0.05 0.072 -0.01 0.69 0.375 -0.35 0.00 0.030 0.00 0.92 
Higher Ed 0.127 0.01 0.87 0.038 0.13 0.00 0.125 0.11 0.35 0.183 0.06 0.20 
Hotel & 
Resort 0.035 -0.01 0.68 0.021 0.00 0.70 -0.125 0.14 0.00 0.012 0.00 0.82 
Park 0.015 0.01 0.55 0.004 0.02 0.06 0.000 0.04 0.39 0.022 0.00 0.93 
Restaurant -0.015 0.06 0.00 -0.004 0.04 0.00 -0.250 0.27 0.00 0.040 -0.01 0.55 
Stadium 0.000 0.00 0.40 -0.013 0.02 0.01 N/A N/A N/A 0.016 -0.01 0.14 
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Figure 1: Point Distribution for All New Construction with Kernel Density Curve, two lowest / 
highest score possibilities dropped 
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Supporting Information 
Table SI1: New Construction, Buildings Earning Lowest and Highest Score In Each Category 
Excluded 
 Points Earned Actual Predicted Difference 
 25 1 26 -25 
     
Ce
rti
fie
d 
26 243 85 158 
27 178 165 13 
28 195 217 -22 
29 164 216 -52 
30 147 179 -31 
31 96 128 -30 
32 66 112 -46 
     
Si
lv
er
 
33 494 209 285 
34 430 356 74 
35 384 420 -36 
36 289 354 -63 
37 150 227 -77 
38 48 155 -106 
     
G
ol
d 
39 523 205 318 
40 437 326 111 
41 287 380 -93 
42 258 339 -81 
43 192 268 -76 
44 131 198 -67 
45 94 140 -46 
46 65 97 -32 
47 41 65 -24 
48 27 41 -14 
49 16 25 -9 
50 6 14 -8 
51 1 14 -13 
     
Pl
at
in
um
 
52 65 28 37 
53 65 48 17 
54 44 54 -10 
55 34 47 -13 
56 22 36 -14 
57 23 26 -3 
58 8 17 -9 
59 6 10 -4 
60 4 6 -2 
61 2 4 -2 
62 1 2 -1 
63 1 1 0 
64 0 0 0 
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Table SI2 Difference between Actual and Kernel Density Projected as a Percentage of Total 
Projects, Ownership Type Comparison, lowest and highest point possibility dropped 
 
Points 
Earned 
All New 
Construction Government For Profit Non Profit 
 
25 -0.5 -0.7 -1.1 -1.1 
Ce
rti
fie
d 
26 3.1 3.1 2.2 3.2 
27 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.3 
28 -0.2 0.0 0.8 0.2 
29 -0.9 -0.5 -0.9 0.0 
30 -0.6 -0.8 0.3 -1.2 
31 -0.8 -0.6 -1.7 -1.4 
32 -1.4 -1.9 -2.3 -1.9 
Si
lv
er
 
33 5.3 4.9 5.9 4.8 
34 1.5 2.2 1.3 4.0 
35 -0.4 0.6 1.8 -0.4 
36 -1.1 -1.5 0.0 -0.3 
37 -1.6 -1.6 -2.2 -2.3 
38 -2.3 -2.8 -4.0 -3.2 
G
ol
d 
39 6.0 5.8 4.2 4.9 
40 2.3 2.1 3.3 2.8 
41 -1.5 -1.3 -0.4 0.0 
42 -1.3 -0.7 -1.1 -1.0 
43 -1.2 -1.6 -1.7 -0.4 
44 -1.1 -1.7 -1.1 -1.3 
45 -0.8 -1.0 -0.9 -1.1 
46 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 
47 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 
48 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 
49 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 
50 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.9 
51 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -1.1 
Pl
at
in
um
 
52 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.3 
53 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.6 
54 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 
55 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 
56 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 
57 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 
58 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 
59 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 
60 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
61 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 
62 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
63 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Figure SI1: Point Distribution for All New Construction with Kernel Density Curve, lowest / 
highest score possibility dropped 
 
Figure SI2: Point Distribution for All For Profit Construction with Kernel Density Curve, two 
lowest / highest score possibilities dropped 
 
 
Figure SI3: Point Distribution for Government Construction with Kernel Density Curve, two 
lowest / highest score possibilities dropped 
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Figure SI4: Point Distribution for Government with Kernel Density Curve, 1 dropped score 
 
Figure SI5: Point Distribution for For-Profit with Kernel Density Curve, 1 dropped score 
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Figure SI6: Point Distribution for Non-Profit with Kernel Density Curve, 1 dropped score 
 
Figure SI7: Point Distribution for Non-Profit with Kernel Density Curve, two lowest / highest 
score possibilities dropped 
 
